A Note on “Modeling the Birth and Death of Cartels with An Application to Evaluating Competition Policy” by Harrington and Chang (2009) by Zhou, Jun
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15  www.sfbtr15.de 
Universität Mannheim  Freie Universität Berlin  Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin  Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn  Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Urs Schweizer.  Department of Economics  University of Bonn  D-53113 Bonn, 
Phone: +49(0228)739220  Fax: +49(0228)739221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, University of Bonn 
 
 
 
 
September 2011 
 
 
 
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. 
Discussion Paper No. 362 
 
A Note on “Modeling the Birth 
and Death of Cartels with An 
Application to Evaluating 
Competition Policy” by 
Harrington and Chang (2009) 
 
Jun Zhou * 
A Note on “Modeling the Birth and Death of Cartels
with An Application to Evaluating Competition Policy”
by Harrington and Chang (2009)1
Jun Zhou, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Bonn University
In the December 2009 issue of the Journal of European Economic Association, Harrington
and Chang presented a model of dynamic cartel formation and dissolution where an industry of
firms interact repeatedly over an infinite time horizon. Absent antitrust intervention, there is a
“marginal industry” in which firms are indifferent between collusion and competing because the
short-run gain of cheating for each firm equals its long-run benefit from colluding. An efficacious
antitrust innovation works its effect by increasing a firm’s short-run benefit from cheating to a
level that exceeds its long-run gains from colluding. In this way, the policy-innovation moves
the “marginal type” from a population of sustainable, longer-lived cartels to a population of
unstable, shorter-lived ones. The model generates intuitive predictions that can be used to
assess the efficacy of antitrust innovations (such as the leniency program): The impact of an
efficacious policy on the duration of discovered cartels is time-dependent. In particular, following
an antitrust innovation that increases probability of detection, the marginal cartels immediately
break up and the ensuing cartel discovery comes from a population of longer-lasting cartels.
Because of such a sample selection effect, the average duration of discovered cartels increases in
the short-run. That is, the short-run distribution of cartel duration dominates the steady-state
pre-innovation distribution in the sense of first order stochastic dominance (FOSD) (Theorem 7
of Harrington and Chang); in the long run, the duration decreases due to the enhanced overall
deterrence. That is, the post-innovation steady-state distribution of cartel duration dominates
the short-run one in the sense of FOSD (Theorem 8 of Harrington and Chang).
These theoretical predictions can be tested empirically but not direct ways. This is because
the estimation of the cartel duration from discovered cartels must consider the censoring of
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duration for cartels ending due to antitrust interventions (Levenstein and Suslow (forthcom-
ing)). For such cartels, we can only infer that collusion would have exceeded the observed cartel
duration at the time of the cartel’s dissolution. In this note, I provide two stronger theorems
than Theorems 7 and 8 in Harrington and Chang. My results can be directly corroborated in
a empirical model of survival analysis— a by now standard approach to the analysis of cartel
durations.2 They relate to the probability that a cartel survives for t periods conditional on
the event that the cartel survives for at least t periods, i.e., the dissolution hazard of discovered
cartels.
In particular, I show within Harrington and Chang’s framework that (1) in the short-run an
after an antitrust innovation that raises the probability of detection, the distribution of cartel
duration shifts and dominates, in the sense of hazard rate dominance (HRD), the pre-innovation
distribution; and that (2) in the long run after the innovation, the distribution readjusts and
dominates the short-run distribution in the sense of HRD.
2. The Model
2.1. Industrial Behavior
Consider the following dynamic model of cartel formation and dissolution that is adapted from
Harrington and Chang (2009). There is a population of oligopolistic industries. Time is discrete
and N identical firms play an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in each industry. In each
period, there is a stochastic realization of a market’s profitability that is summarized by pi.
Each firm earns pi if they collude; if not, they compete and each firm earns αpi; without loss
of generality, I normalize α to 0. A cartel participant earns θpi (with θ > 1) by unilaterally
deviating from a collusive arrangement, where θ represents the value of deviation. θ is drawn
from a distribution F with support [θ, θ¯] and positive continuous density f . At the beginning
of each period, pi is observed by the firms prior to deciding how to behave. pi is given by a
distribution G with support [pi, p¯i] and positive continuous density g. The firms discount time
at the same rate; their discount factor is δ where 0 < δ < 1.
At the beginning of each period, industries are either cartelized or not. Industries that were
cartelized at the end of the previous period are currently cartelized; Industries that were not
cartelized at the end of the previous period have an opportunity to do so with probability p
(with 0 < p < 1). If a cartel collapses at the end of a period – either due to self-defect or an
2
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antitrust intervention – then with probability p the industry has an opportunity to re-cartelize
in the next period. Let y0 (resp. w0) denote the present value of a firm’s payoff when an
industry is cartelized (resp. not cartelized). If the industry is not currently cartelized, then
with probability p it can cartelize with each firm earning y0; with probability 1 − p the firms
continue to compete and each firm earns 0 in the present period and w0 in the following periods.
It follows that w0 = py0 + (1− p)δw0.
An antitrust policy is a pair of parameters 〈σ, γ〉, where σ ∈ (0, 1) is the probability that
the antitrust authority detects and penalizes a cartel at the end of each period. The (present
value of) total amount of fines that a cartel participant pays is γy0, where γ > 0 is the fine
multiplier.
Suppose that a cartel has formed and that pi is realized. If a firm sticks to the collusive
agreement, then it earns pi in the present period and with probability 1−σ it escapes detection
and continues to earn y0 in the following periods; and with probability σ it is caught and
pays a fine of γy0 at the end of the present period and earns w0 in the following periods. If,
however, the firm unilaterally deviates from the agreement, then it earns θpi in the present
period and w0 in the following periods; Moreover, at the end of the present period it will be
fined for an amount of γy0 with probability σ.3 Write y ≡ (1 − δ)y0 as the re-scaled payoff.
A cartel is sustainable if a firm’s payoff from collusion exceeds that from cheating, i.e., if
pi+δ[(1−σ)y0+σ(w0−γy0)] ≥ θpi+δ(w0−σγy0). Substituting and rearranging the inequality,
we have that a cartel is sustainable if pi ≤ δ(1−σ)(1−p)y
[1−δ(1−p)](θ−1)
. Denote δ(1−σ)(1−p)y
[1−δ(1−p)](θ−1)
by ϕ(y). It
follows that the present value of collusion is:
y0 =
∫ ϕ(y)
pi
{
pi +
δ
1− δ
[
(1− σ)y0 + σ(w0 − γy0)
]}
g(pi)dpi +
∫ p¯i
ϕ(y)
δ
1− δ
(w0 − σγy0)g(pi)dpi, (1)
where the first (resp. second) term of the right-hand side of equation (1) is a firm’s expected
payoff when a cartel can (resp. cannot) be sustained. Substituting and rearranging (1) we
have, due to Harrington and Chang (2009), that y is given by:
y =
∫ ϕ(y)
pi
{
(1− δ)pi + y
[
δ −
δσ(1− p)(1− δ)
1− δ(1− p)
]}
g(pi)dpi +
∫ p¯i
ϕ(y)
δpy
1− δ(1− p)
g(pi)dpi
3The assumption that cheating cartel participants do not escape prosecution is consistent with the actual
practice of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. See, e,g., Judgment of The Court of
Justice in Case C-260/09 P on 10 February 2011, para 19. See also Commission Decision in Case COMP/38.695
on 11 June 2008, para 531.
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− δσγy. (2)
Denote the right-hand side of equation (2) by ψ(y) and let y∗ = max{0 ≤ y ≤ µ | ψ(y) = y}
be the maximal fixed point of ψ(·). The steady-state probability that a cartel survives in any
period– the joint probability that it survives both market fluctuations and detection – is given
by q(σ, θ) = G(ϕ(y∗)) (1− σ).
Let s(t; σ, θ) denote the the steady-state share of cartels with a duration of t periods in a
type-θ industry under policy σ, where t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}; 1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ, θ) is then the share that
survive for at least t periods. t = 0 means that industry θ is not cartelized. These steady-state
shares follow from Harrington and Chang (2009):
s(0; σ, θ) =
1− q(σ, θ)
1− (1− p)q(σ, θ)
; (3)
s(t; σ, θ) =
p (1− q(σ, θ)) q(σ, θ)t
1− (1− p)q(σ, θ)
for all t ∈ {1, 2, ...}; (4)
1−
t−1∑
tˆ=0
s(tˆ; σ, θ) =
p q(σ, θ)t
1− (1− p)q(σ, θ)
. (5)
2.2. The Hazard Rate of Cartel Dissolution
From the results above, I derive theoretical predictions that can be tested empirically. They
relate to the probability that a cartel survives for t periods conditional on the event that
the cartel survives for at least t periods, i.e., the dissolution hazard of discovered cartels. An
antitrust innovation, such as a leniency program, affects the hazard over time. I model an
antitrust innovation as an exogenous change in the detection rate from σ1 to σ2 (with σ2 > σ1).
Equations (3), (4) and (5) give the steady-state dissolution hazard of discovered cartels in
industry θ prior to the innovation:
h(t; σ1, θ) =
s(t; σ1, θ)
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
= 1− q(σ1, θ), t ∈ {1, 2, ...}; (6)
and the average steady-state dissolution hazard of discovered cartels prior to the innovation:
h˜(t; σ1) =
∫
Θ1
s(t; σ1, θ)f(θ)dθ
1−
∫
Θ1
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)f(θ)dθ
, t ∈ {1, 2, ...}, (7)
where Θ1 is the set of industries in which collusion can be sustained prior to the innovation.
Rearranging (7), we have that
h˜(t; σ1) =
∫
Θ1
[
s(t; σ1, θ)
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
×
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)∫
Θ1
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ
]
dθ
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=
∫
Θ1
[
h(t; σ1, θ)×
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)∫
Θ1
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ
]
dθ. (8)
h˜(t; σ1) is then the weighted average of h(t; σ1, θ), where the associated weight is the probability
that a cartel with a duration of at least t periods is of type θ.
After the innovation, a subset of industries in Θ1 become no longer capable of sustaining
collusion and the distribution of cartels shifts, immediately, from(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)∫
Θ1
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ
to
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)∫
Θ2
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ
,
where Θ2 denotes the set of industries capable of sustaining collusion after the innovation.
But in the short run durations stay unadjusted for the remaining cartels, i.e., their dissolution
hazard is unchanged. The average dissolution hazard shifts, in the short run, to:
h˜(t; σ1, σ2) =
∫
Θ2
[
h(t; σ1, θ)×
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)∫
Θ2
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ
]
dθ. (9)
The transition from the short run to the new steady state involves the duration of the sur-
viving cartels adjusting in each industry: The industry-level hazard shifts from h(t; σ1, θ) to
h(t; σ2, θ) =
s(t;σ2,θ)
1−
∑
t−1
tˆ=0
s(tˆ,σ2,θ)
. As a result, the average hazard readjusts, in the long run, to
h˜(t; σ2) =
∫
Θ2
[
h(t; σ2, θ)×
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ2, θ)
)
f(θ)∫
Θ2
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ2, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ
]
dθ.
I start by providing two lemmas that will be used in the proof of the main results of this note.
Lemma 1. (Hazard Rate Dominance): The steady-state dissolution hazard in an industry
is increasing in the profitability of deviation and the detection rate. That is,
∂
∂θ
h(t; σ, θ) ≥ 0 and
∂
∂σ
h(t; σ, θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜(σ)], for all σ ∈ (0, 1), and for all
t ∈ {1, 2, ...}.
Proof. Note that y∗ is a function of θ and σ. Taking the derivative of q(σ, θ) with respect to
θ, we have that ∂
∂θ
q(σ, θ) = (1 − σ) × ∂
∂ϕ(y∗)
G(ϕ(y∗)) × ∂
∂θ
ϕ(y∗). By construction, 1 − σ > 0
and ∂
∂ϕ(y∗)
G(ϕ(y∗)) ≥ 0. It follows from Harrington and Change (2009) that ∂
∂θ
ϕ(y∗) ≤ 0.
Therefore, ∂
∂θ
q(σ, θ) ≤ 0. That is, making deviation more profitable reduces the probability
that a cartel will survive in any period. Taking the derivative of (6) with respective to θ, we
obtain that ∂
∂θ
h(t; σ, θ) = − ∂
∂θ
q(σ, θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜(σ)].
By performing similar steps, we obtain that ∂
∂σ
h(t; σ, θ) = − ∂
∂σ
q(σ, θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜(σ)].
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Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. If σ is sufficiently small then there exists θ˜(σ) ∈ [θ, θ¯] such that y∗ T 0 for all
θ S θ˜(σ). Moreover, θ˜(σ) is decreasing in σ. That is, there exists a cut-off value of deviation
below which cartels can be sustained in steady state when the probability of detection is suffi-
ciently low. Moreover, raising the detection rate reduces the cut-off value.
Proof. The proof is given in Harrington and Chang (2009). I omit it.
We now arrive at the main result of the theoretical model:
Theorem 1. If σ1 < σ2, then h˜(t; σ1) ≥ h˜(t; σ1, σ2) for all t ∈ {1, 2, ...}. That is, an
increase in the detection rate leads to an immediate fall in the average dissolution hazard of
discovered cartels after an innovation.
Proof. Due to Lemma 2, we can write Θ1 and Θ2 – the sets of industries capable of sus-
taining collusion under policies σ1 and σ2– as [θ, θ] and [θ, θ], respectively. For the sake of
brevity, write
ρ(σ1, θ) =
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)∫ θ˜(σ1)
θ
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ
and ρ(σ1, σ2, θ) =
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ
(10)
as the distribution of cartels under policy σ1 in steady state and in distribution in the short run,
respectively. Suppose that an antitrust innovation raises the probability of detection from σ1
to σ2 and the economy is in its steady state prior to the innovation. The stationary dissolution
hazard under policy σ1 can be rewritten as follows:
h˜(t; σ1) =
∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ
ρ(σ1, θ)h(t; σ1, θ)dθ +
∫ θ˜(σ1)
θ˜(σ2)
ρ(σ1, θ)h(t; σ1, θ)dθ =
ρ(σ1, θ)
ρ(σ1, σ2, θ)
×
∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ
ρ(σ1, σ2, θ)h(t; σ1, θ)dθ +
ρ(σ1, σ2, θ)− ρ(σ1, θ)
ρ(σ1, σ2, θ)
×
∫ θ˜(σ1)
θ˜(σ2)
ρ(σ1, θ)ρ(σ1, σ2, θ)
ρ(σ1, σ2, θ)− ρ(σ1, θ)
h(t; σ1, θ)dθ.
It follows that
h˜(t; σ1)− h˜(t; σ1, σ2) =
(
1−
ρ(σ1, θ)
ρ(σ1, σ2, θ)
)
×
(∫ θ˜(σ1)
θ˜(σ2)
ρ(σ1, θ)ρ(σ1, σ2, θ)
ρ(σ1, σ2, θ)− ρ(σ1, θ)
h(t; σ1, θ)dθ
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−
∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ
ρ(σ1, σ2, θ)h(t; σ1, θ)dθ
)
. (11)
If σ2 > σ1, then θ˜(σ1) ≥ θ˜(σ2) due to Lemma 2. θ˜(σ1) ≥ θ˜(σ2) implies that∫ θ˜(σ1)
θ
(
1−
t−1∑
tˆ=0
s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ ≥
∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ
(
1−
t−1∑
tˆ=0
s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ.
Therefore,
ρ(σ1, σ2, θ) =
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ
≥
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)∫ θ˜(σ1)
θ
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ
= ρ(σ1, θ).
We therefore obtain that 1 − ρ(σ1,θ)
ρ(σ1,σ2,θ)
≥ 0. Substituting (10) into the second term on the
right-hand side of equation (11) and rearranging, we have that
h˜(t; σ1)−h˜(t; σ1, σ2) =
(
1−
ρ(σ1, θ)
ρ(σ1, σ2, θ)
)
×


∫ θ˜(σ1)
θ˜(σ2)

 (1−∑t−1tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)) f(θ)∫ θ˜(σ1)
θ˜(σ2)
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ

h(t; σ1, θ)dθ
−
∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ

 (1−∑t−1tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)) f(θ)∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ

h(t; σ1, θ)dθ

 .
Due to Lemma 1, we have that h(t; σ, θa) ≥ h(t; σ, θb) for all θa ∈ (θ˜(σ2), θ˜(σ1)] and for all
θb ∈ [θ, θ˜(σ2)]. It follows that
∫ θ˜(σ1)
θ˜(σ2)

 (1−∑t−1tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)) f(θ)∫ θ˜(σ1)
θ˜(σ2)
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ

h(t; σ1, θ)dθ ≥
∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ

 (1−∑t−1tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)) f(θ)∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ1, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ

h(t; σ1, θ)dθ.
Therefore, if σ2 > σ1, then h˜(t; σ1) ≥ h˜(t; σ1, σ2) for all t ∈ {1, 2, ...}.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 2. If σ1 < σ2, then h˜(t; σ1, σ2) ≤ h˜(t; σ2) for all t ∈ {1, 2, ...}. That is, after the
immediate fall in the average hazard of discovered cartels following an increase in the detection
rate, the hazard readjusts above the short-run levels.
Proof. Integration by parts yield that
h˜(t; σ2) =
∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ

h(t; σ2, θ)×


∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ

 (1−∑t−1tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ2, θ)) f(θ)∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ2, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ

 dθ



 dθ
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−
∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ

 ∂
∂θ
h(t; σ2, θ)×


∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ

 (1−∑t−1tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ2, θ)) f(θ)∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ
(
1−
∑t−1
tˆ=0 s(tˆ, σ2, θ)
)
f(θ)dθ

 dθ



 dθ
=
∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ
h(t; σ2, θ)dθ −
(
h(t; σ2, θ˜(σ2))− h(t; σ2, θ)
)
.
Performing similar steps, we obtain that h˜(t; σ1, σ2) =
∫ θ˜(σ2)
θ
h(t; σ1, θ)dθ −
(
h(t; σ1, θ˜(σ2))
−h(t; σ1, θ)
)
. Due to Lemma 1, ∂
∂θ
h(t; σ, θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜(σ)]. Therefore, σ1 < σ2
implies h(t; σ1, θ) ≤ h(t; σ2, θ) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜(σ1)]. Because, (θ, θ˜(σ2)) ⊆ [θ, θ˜(σ1)], it follows
that that h(t; σ1, θ) ≤ h(t; σ2, θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ˜(σ2)). It follows that h˜(t; σ2) ≥ h˜(t; σ1, σ2).
Q.E.D.
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